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1
1 Introduction
Many block ciphers used in real life applications are translation based ciphers,
which are essentially iterated block ciphers obtained by the composition of sev-
eral “round functions”, that is, key-dependent permutations of the message/cipher
space. This class of ciphers has been introduced by Caranti, Dalla Volta and
Sala, in [11], and contains well-known ciphers like AES [14], SERPENT [1] and
PRESENT [6], where this latter is one of the most common lightweight ciphers
(i.e., ciphers able to run on devices with very low computing power).
Since 1975, when Coppersmith and Grossman [13] defined a set of functions
which can be adapted for constructing a block cipher, and studied the permutation
group generated by them, much attention has been devoted to the group generated
by the round functions of a block cipher. In this context, Kaliski, Rivest and
Sherman [16] proved that if such a group is too small, then the cipher is vulnerable
to certain cryptanalytic attacks. Later, Paterson [22] showed that the imprimitivity
of the group can be used to construct a trapdoor that may be difficult to detect.
For a translation based cipher, in [11], the authors provided two cryptographic
conditions on S-Boxes (i.e., the weakly differential uniformity and the strongly anti-
invariance) which guarantee the primitivity of the group generated by the round
functions of the cipher. Furthermore, in [10], using the O’Nan-Scott classification
of finite primitive groups, together with another cryptographic assumption, it has
been proved that the group in question is the alternating group. Unfortunately,
both these results are not applicable to the PRESENT cipher. Motivated by this,
in the present paper we continue the study of the group generated by the round
functions of a translation based cipher.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall some definitions and
a series of properties and already known results on translation based ciphers. In
Section 3, we deal with primitive groups containing an abelian regular subgroup.
In particular, we prove the primitivity of the group G generated by the round func-
tions of a translation based cipher satisfying different cryptographic assumptions
with respect to the result given in [11]. More precisely, we consider the differential
uniformity which allows us to relax the hypothesis on the strongly anti-invariance.
Then, in Section 4, we provide some additional conditions from which it follows
that G is the alternating group. This is, for instance, the case when under the
same hypotheses a round of the cipher is strongly proper and consists of m-bit S-
Boxes, with m = 3,4 or 5. As an immediate consequence, we deduce that the round
functions of some lightweight ciphers, such as PRESENT [6], RECTANGLE [28]
and PRINTcipher [17], generate the alternating group. Finally, in Section 5, we
put in evidence the relationship between the non-linearity of a permutation and
the strongly anti-invariance.
2
2 Translation based ciphers
Let C be a block cipher acting on a message space V = (F2)
d, for some d ≥ 1, and
suppose that V coincides with the ciphertext space. Denote by K its key space.
Then any key k ∈ K induces a permutation τk on V and C = {τk ∣k ∈ K}. We are
interested in determining the subgroup
Γ = Γ(C) = ⟨τk ∣ k ∈ K⟩
of the symmetric group on V generated by all permutations τk.
Unfortunately, the study of Γ appears a difficult problem. However, most mod-
ern block ciphers are iterated ciphers, i.e., obtained by a composition of several
rounds. This allows to investigate an easier permutation group related to Γ. As-
sume therefore that C is an iterated block cipher. Then each τk is a composition
of some permutations of V , say τk,1, . . . , τk,l. For any round h, let
Γh = Γh(C) = ⟨τk,h ∣ k ∈ K⟩.
Thus we can define a new group containing Γ, that is
Γ∞ = Γ∞(C) = ⟨Γh ∣ h ∈ {1, . . . , l}⟩,
which is also known as the group generated by the round functions.
To better understand the structure of Γ∞, we refer to translation based ciphers
[11, 3]. This is a class of iterated block ciphers including some well-known ciphers,
as for instance AES [14] and SERPENT [1].
In order to recall the definition of a translation based cipher C and cite some
results on Γ∞(C), we first fix the notation. Let m,n > 1 and
V = V1 ⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ Vn,
where each Vi is isomorphic to (F2)
m. As usual, we denote by Sym(V ) and Alt(V )
the symmetric group and the alternating group on V , respectively. Given v ∈ V ,
we write σv ∈ Sym(V ) for the translation of V mapping x to x + v and denote
by T (V ) = {σv ∣ v ∈ V } the group of all translations of V . Clearly T (V ) is an
elementary abelian regular subgroup of Sym(V ). Also, we denote by GL(V ) the
group of linear permutations on V and by AGL(V ) = GL(V )⋉ T (V ) the group of
affine transformations of V .
Any γ ∈ Sym(V) is called a bricklayer transformation if, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and v = v1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + vn, with vi ∈ Vi, there exists a brick γi ∈ Sym(Vi) such that
vγ = v1γ1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + vnγn.
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In symmetric cryptography, the permutation γ is traditionally called parallel S-
Box, and each γi is an m-bit S-Box.
A linear map λ ∶ V → V is a mixing layer when it is used in composition with
a bricklayer transformation. We say that a nontrivial proper subspace W of V is a
wall if it is a sum of some of the subspaces Vi. A linear permutation λ ∈ GL(V ) is
then a proper mixing layer if no wall is λ-invariant. We also say that λ is a strongly
proper mixing layer if there are no walls W and W ′ such that Wλ =W ′.
Definition 2.1 (see [11]). An iterated block cipher C = {τk ∣ k ∈ K} over F2 is
translation based (tb, for short) if the following hold:
(1) each τk is the composition of a finite number, say l, of round functions
τk,h, with k ∈ K and h ∈ {1, . . . , l}, such that each τk,h can be written as a
composition γhλhσφ(k,h) of three permutations of V , where
- γh is a bricklayer transformation not depending on k and 0γh = 0,
- λh is a linear permutation not depending on k,
- φ ∶ K × {1, . . . , l} → V is the key scheduling function, so that φ(k,h) is
the h-th round key, given by the master key k;
(2) at least one round is a proper round, that is,
- λh is a proper mixing layer for some h, and
- the map φh ∶ K → V given by k → φ(k,h) is surjective.
As noted in [11, Remark 3.3] the assumption 0γh = 0 in (1) is not restrictive.
Indeed, we can always include 0γh in the round key addition of the previous round.
In what follows, for a fixed round h, we drop the round index h and denote
by ρσk, with ρ = γλ, the corresponding round function. Furthermore, we refer to
a strongly proper round whenever the mixing layer of a proper round is strongly
proper.
Lemma 2.2. Let C be any tb cipher. Then Γ∞(C) contains only even permutations.
Proof. Let τk,h = γλσk be an arbitrary round function. Clearly σk is an even
permutation and, by [27, Lemma 2], λ is also even. We show that γ is even, from
which the claim follows.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let γi be the permutation of V given by
(x1, . . . , xn)γi = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xiγi, xi+1, . . . , xn).
Notice that γ = γ1γ2 . . . γn. Also, if γi is the product of t transpositions, then
γi is the product of t ⋅ 2
m(n−1) = t ⋅ 2d−m transpositions. Thus each γi is an even
permutation and so is γ, as required.
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Let G be a transitive permutation group on a set X. Recall that a partition B
of X is trivial if B = {X} or B = {{x} ∣x ∈ X}, and it is G-invariant if Y g ∈ B for
any Y ∈ B and g ∈ G. The group G is then called primitive if it has no nontrivial
G-invariant partition of X. On the other hand, if a nontrivial G-invariant partition
exists, the group is called imprimitive and the partition is a block system of G on
X.
We now collect together some results which can be found in [3] (see Lemma
3.4, Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 3.6).
Lemma 2.3. Let C be a tb cipher with a proper round h. Then
(i) Γh(C) = ⟨ρ,T (V )⟩;
(ii) Γh(C) is imprimitive on V if and only if there exists a nontrivial proper
subspace U of V such that (u + v)γ + vγ ∈ Uλ−1, for all u ∈ U and v ∈ V . A
block system is then of the form {U + v ∣v ∈ V }.
Let δ and m be positive integers, and let f ∶ (F2)
m → (F2)
m be a vectorial
Boolean function. Denote by fˆu(x) = f(x + u) + f(x) the derivative of f in the
direction of u ∈ (F2)
m. Recall that f is differentially δ-uniform (or δ-uniform, for
short) if
∣{x ∈ (F2)
m
∶ fˆu(x) = v}∣ ≤ δ,
for all u, v ∈ (F2)
m, with u ≠ 0. By [11, Fact 3], it follows that
∣Im(fˆu)∣ ≥
2m
δ
.
Following [11], we say that f is weakly δ-uniform if
∣Im(fˆu)∣ >
2m−1
δ
,
for all u ∈ (F2)
m/{0}. Of course, every δ-uniform function is weakly δ-uniform.
Given 1 ≤ r <m, we also say that f is r-anti-invariant if f(0) = 0 and, for any
subspace U of (F2)
m such that f(U) = U , either dim(U) < m − r or U = (F2)
m.
Furthermore, f is said to be strongly r-anti-invariant if, for any two subspaces U
and W of (F2)
m such that f(U) = W , then either dim(U) = dim(W ) < m − r or
U =W = (F2)
m.
The next result is Theorem 4.4 of [11].
Theorem 2.4. Let C be a tb cipher with a proper round h. Suppose that, for some
1 ≤ r <m, each brick of γ is
(i) weakly 2r-uniform, and
(ii) strongly r-anti-invariant.
Then Γh(C) is primitive, and hence so is Γ∞(C).
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2.1 Some applications to real-life Cryptography
AES and SERPENT are two translation based ciphers used in real-life applications
and their bricks satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 2.4; as a consequence, Γ∞(AES)
and Γ∞(SERPENT) are primitive groups [11]. Actually, in [27] and [26], with
an ad hoc proof, it has been proved respectively that Γ∞(AES) = Alt(V ) and
Γ∞(SERPENT) = Alt(V ). See also [10, 23] for an AES-like cipher, [4] for a GOST-
like cipher, and [25, 24] for DES and KASUMI respectively.
Other interesting translation based ciphers are those of type lightweight, i.e.,
ciphers designed to run on devices with very low computing power. The most
used in real life applications is PRESENT [6] and we would like to apply similar
techniques, in order to investigate Γ∞(PRESENT). In the case of PRESENT, we
have V = (F2)
64. The S-Box used in PRESENT is always the same. It is a 4-bit
S-Box γ ∶ (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 and its action in hexadecimal notation is given in Table
1. The mixing layer of PRESENT is given in Table 2 and it is proper.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
xγ C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
Table 1: PRESENT S-Box
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
iλ 0 16 32 48 1 17 33 49 2 18 34 50 3 19 35 51
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
iλ 4 20 36 52 5 21 37 53 6 22 38 54 7 23 39 55
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
iλ 8 24 40 56 9 25 41 57 10 26 42 58 11 27 43 59
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
iλ 12 28 44 60 13 29 45 61 14 30 46 62 15 31 47 63
Table 2: PRESENT mixing layer
Remark 2.5. By a computer check (using, for instance, MAGMA [7]) it is possible
to see that the PRESENT mixing layer is strongly proper and its S-Box is weakly
4-uniform and strongly 1-anti-invariant (the strongly anti-invariance is computed
with an equivalent permutation that sends 0 to 0).
By the previous remark, the S-Box of PRESENT does not satisfy the hypothe-
ses of Theorem 2.4. Nevertheless, in the next section, we will see that Γ∞(PRESENT)
is primitive, as well.
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3 Primitive groups with an abelian regular
subgroup
Our first result is similar to Theorem 2.4. We now consider the differential uni-
formity instead of the weakly differential uniformity and this leads to relax the
assumption on the strongly anti-invariance.
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a tb cipher with a proper round h. Suppose that, for some
1 < r <m, each brick of γ is
(i) 2r-uniform, and
(ii) strongly (r − 1)-anti-invariant.
Then Γh(C) is primitive, and hence so is Γ∞(C).
Proof. Suppose that Γh(C) is imprimitive. Then, by (ii) of Lemma 2.3, there exists
a nontrivial proper subspace U of V such that {U + v ∣ v ∈ V } is a block system of
Γh(C) on V . Recall that γλ ∈ Γh(C), by (i) of Lemma 2.3. Thus Uγλ = U + v, for
some v ∈ V . Since 0γλ = 0 we deduce that U +v = U , and therefore W = Uγ = Uλ−1
is a subspace of V .
Let pii be the projection V → Vi and denote by I the set of all i such that
pii(U) ≠ {0}. Clearly I ≠ ∅. Then either U ∩Vi = Vi for all i ∈ I, or there exists j ∈ I
such that U ∩Vj ⊂ Vj . In the first case, U = ⊕i∈IVi is a wall. This gives Uγ = U and
consequently Uλ = U , which is impossible because λ is a proper mixing layer.
Assume U ∩ Vj ⊂ Vj , for some j ∈ I. We claim that U ∩ Vj is nontrivial. Notice
that pij(U) ≠ {0}, so we can consider u ∈ U such that pij(u) = uj ≠ 0. By Lemma 2.3
(ii), for any vj ∈ Vj , we have (u+ vj)γ + vjγ ∈W . Since W is a subspace, it follows
that w = uγ + (u+ vj)γ + vjγ ∈W . Actually w = ujγj + (uj + vj)γj + vjγj ∈W ∩Vj =
(U ∩ Vj)γj . If w = 0 for all vj , then the map γˆjuj is constant, against the fact that
γj is 2
r-uniform and r <m. Hence w ≠ 0 for some vj, and 0 ≠ wγ
−1
j ∈ U ∩ Vj .
Now U ∩ Vj and W ∩ Vj are nontrivial proper subspaces of Vj such that (U ∩
Vj)γj =W ∩ Vj. Moreover, γj is strongly (r − 1)-anti-invariant. Thus
dim(U ∩ Vj) = dim(W ∩ Vj) <m − r + 1. (1)
Let u ∈ (U ∩ Vj)/{0}. Again by (ii) of Lemma 2.3, we have (u + vj)γj + vjγj =
(u+ vj)γ + vjγ ∈W ∩Vj for any vj ∈ Vj. Then Im(γˆju) ⊆W ∩Vj , where ∣Im(γˆju)∣ ≥
2m−r since γj is 2
r-uniform. However 0 ∉ Im(γˆju): otherwise (u + vj)γj = vjγj and
u = 0, since γj is a permutation. It follows that ∣W ∩ Vj ∣ ≥ 2
m−r
+ 1, which implies
that dim(W ∩ Vj) ≥ m − r + 1, in contradiction to (1). This proves that Γh(C) is
primitive.
7
Remark 3.2. The previous theorem, together with Remark 2.5, allows us to
conclude that Γ∞(PRESENT) is primitive. Similarly for the lightweight ciphers
RECTANGLE [28] and PRINTcipher [17]. Indeed, these are tb ciphers with a
strongly proper mixing layer. Furthermore, the RECTANGLE 4-bit S-Box and
the PRINTcipher 3-bit S-Box satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1.
Notice that the structure of Γh(C) is also known. In fact, by (i) of Lemma 2.3,
the group Γh(C) contains T (V ) which is an elementary abelian regular subgroup.
We are thus able to apply the characterization of finite primitive groups with an
abelian regular subgroup [18, Theorem 1.1, see also Lemma 3.6 for more details].
For reader’s convenience, we restate it in the particular case where the degree is
2d, for some d ≥ 1.
Theorem 3.3. Let G be a primitive permutation group of degree 2d, with d ≥ 1.
Then G contains an abelian regular subgroup T if and only if either
(1) G ≤ AGL(d,2), or
(2) G = (S1 × . . . × Sc).O.P and T = T1 × . . . × Tc, where c ≥ 1 divides d, each
Ti < Si with ∣Ti∣ = 2
d/c, the Si are all conjugate, O ≤ Out(S1)× . . .×Out(Sc),
P permutes transitively the Si, and one of the following holds:
(i) Si ≃ PGL(d, q) and Ti is a cyclic group of order (q
d
− 1)/(q − 1), for q
a prime power, or
(ii) Si ≃ Alt(2
d/c) or Sym(2d/c) and Ti is an abelian group of order 2
d/c.
In part (2) the notation G = (S1 × . . . × Sc).O.P denotes that N = S1 × . . . × Sc
is normal in G and G/N is an extension of the group O by the group P . Also,
according to the O’Nan-Scott classification of finite primitive groups, the group in
(1) is of affine type, while the group in (2) is either almost simple, if c = 1, or a
wreath product (in the product action), if c > 1.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.3, we have the following refinement
when T is elementary abelian.
Corollary 3.4. Let G be a primitive permutation group of degree 2d, with d ≥ 1.
Assume that G contains an elementary abelian regular subgroup T . Then one of
the following holds:
(1) G is of affine type, that is, G ≤ AGL(d,2);
(2) G ≃ Alt(2d) or Sym(2d);
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(3) G is a wreath product, that is,
G = (S1 × . . . × Sc).O.P and T = T1 × . . . × Tc,
where c > 1 divides d, each Ti is an abelian subgroup of Si of order 2
d/c with
Si ≃ Alt(2
d/c) or Sym(2d/c), the Si are all conjugate, O ≤ Out(S1) × . . . ×
Out(Sc), and P permutes transitively the Si.
In particular, if d ≤ 5, then G cannot be a wreath product.
Proof. Suppose that G is not affine. Then G is as in part (2) of Theorem 3.3. Let
us consider the case when G satisfies (i). Since T is an elementary abelian 2-group
and each Ti is cyclic, it follows that ∣Ti∣ = 2. Hence
(qd − 1)/(q − 1) = qd−1 + qd−2 + . . . + q + 1 = 2,
which is impossible. Thus G satisfies (ii) and, of course, we have G ≃ Alt(2d) or
Sym(2d) provided that c = 1.
Finally, if d ≤ 5, then the socle soc(Si) of each Si is the Klein group, if Si ≃
Alt(4) or Sym(4), and it is trivial otherwise. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.6 in
[18] (see the proof), the socle of G is a non-abelian group given by soc(S1) × . . . ×
soc(Sc). Therefore (3) cannot occur in this case.
Next we will show that a primitive group on V = (F2)
d cannot be of affine
type, if d is small and the group is generated by two abelian regular subgroups.
First we recall a few preliminary results.
By [9, Theorem 1], for any abelian regular subgroup T of the affine group on
(V,+), there is a structure of an associative, commutative, nilpotent ring (V,○, ⋅)
on V , where the circle operation is given by
x ○ v = x + v + x ⋅ v,
for all x, v ∈ V . If T is also elementary, then (V,○) is a vector space over F2 such that
T is the related translation group. Let T+ and T○ be the translation groups with
respect to the operations + and ○, respectively, and let us consider the following
subspaces
U○ = {v ∈ V ∣ x ⋅ v = 0 for all x ∈ V }
and
W○ = ⟨x ⋅ v ∣ x, v ∈ V ⟩
of V . By [8, Proposition 2.1.6], if T+ ≠ T○, then 1 ≤ dim(U○) ≤ d − 2. Hence, we
have d > 2. Furthermore, slight modifications of Theorem 2.1.18 and Corollary
2.1.29, in [8], allows us to state that W○ ≤ U○ when d = 3,4 or 5; in addition, if
dim(U○) = d − 2, then dim(W○) = 1. It follows that dim(W○) = 1 if d = 3 or 4, and
dim(W○) = 1 or 2 if d = 5.
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Proposition 3.5. Let d = 3,4 or 5, and let G be a primitive group on V = (F2)
d.
If G is generated by two elementary abelian regular subgroups, then G ≃ Alt(V ) or
Sym(V ).
Proof. Suppose that G is neither isomorphic to Sym(V ) nor to Alt(V ). Then,
by Corollary 3.4, we may assume G ≤ AGL(V,+). Since G is generated by two
elementary abelian regular subgroups, by [9, Theorem 1], we may also assume
G = ⟨T○, T◻⟩, where T○ and T◻ are the translations groups with respect to the
operations ○ and ◻. Suppose T○ = T+. Since dim(U◻) ≥ 1, there exists x ∈ V /{0}
such that x ◻ v = x+ v, for all v ∈ V . Thus {{0, x} + v ∣ v ∈ V } is a block system for
G and G is imprimitive, a contradiction. Similarly, if T
◻
= T+. Hence T○ and T◻ are
both different from T+, and therefore we can apply the results mentioned above.
Keeping the same notation, we have dim(W○+W◻) < d, so that W○+W◻ is a proper
subspace of V .
For any u ∈ V , let τ ○u and τ
◻
u be the translations by u with respect to ○ and
◻, respectively. Then τ ○u = κ
○
uσu, for some κ
○
u ∈ GL(V,+) and σu ∈ T+. Take any
x ∈W○ +W◻. Recall that x ○ u = x + u + x ⋅ u. Thus
x ⋅ u = xτ ○u + x + u = xκ
○
u + x
and, since x ⋅ u ∈W○, we have xκ
○
u = x ⋅ u + x ∈W○ +W◻. It follows that
((W○ +W◻) + v)τ
○
u = (W○ +W◻)κ
○
u + vκ
○
u + u = (W○ +W◻) + vκ
○
u + u,
for all v ∈ V . Clearly, the same holds for τ ◻u. This proves that {(W○+W◻)+v ∣v ∈ V }
is a block system for G, our final contradiction.
We point out that the previous result cannot be extended to d = 6, indeed a
counterexample can be constructed with the aid of MAGMA [7].
4 The main results
In this section, for a tb cipher C over (F2)
mn with a strongly proper round h, we
wonder when Γ∞(C) is the alternating group. Of course, it is enough to consider
Γh(C). Thus, assuming that Γh(C) is primitive, by Corollary 3.4 and Lemma 2.2
we can restrict our attention to the cases where Γh(C) is of affine type or a wreath
product.
Following [8], we say that a vectorial Boolean function f :V → V is anti-crooked
(AC, for short) if, for any a ∈ V /{0}, the set
Im(fˆa) = {f(x + a) + f(x) ∣ x ∈ V }
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is not an affine subspace of V .
In [3], part (2) of Theorem 4.5, the AC condition has been used to avoid that
Γ∞(C) is of affine type. This result remains valid for Γh(C).
Proposition 4.1. Let C be a tb cipher with a proper round h where any brick is
AC. If Γh(C) is primitive, then it is not of affine type.
However the bricks of some tb ciphers, as for example the S-Box of PRESENT,
are not AC. We therefore provide the following alternative condition.
Proposition 4.2. Let C be a tb cipher over V = (F2)
mn, with m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 2.
Suppose that there exists a brick γi corresponding to a proper round h such that
Alt(Vi) ⊆ ⟨T (Vi), γiT (Vi)γ
−1
i ⟩. (2)
If Γh(C) is a primitive group, then it is not of affine type.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Γh(C) ≤ AGL(mn,2) (see Corollary 3.4). Let
τi ∈ Alt(Vi) be a 3-cycle and, for any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ V , define τ ∈ Sym(V ) to
be the permutation
x ↦ (x1, . . . , xi−1, xiτi, xi+1, . . . , xn).
The claim will follow once it is shown that τ ∈ Γh(C). In fact, the minimal degree
of AGL(mn,2) is 2mn−1, where the minimal degree is the minimum number of
elements moved by a non-identity permutation (see, for instance, [15, Section 3.3]).
On the other hand, τ moves exactly 3 ⋅2m(n−1) elements. This is impossible because
3 ⋅ 2m(n−1) < 2mn−1, for any m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 2.
By (2), we have τi = τi1τi2 . . . τis where each τir = σki or γiσk′iγ
−1
i , for some
ki, k
′
i ∈ Vi. Since h is a proper round, we can consider round keys k, k
′ ∈ V such
that k = (0, . . . ,0, ki,0 . . . ,0) and k
′ = (0, . . . ,0, k′i,0 . . . ,0). Put ρk = ρσk, and
similarly for k′. Then, for any x ∈ V , we have
xρ−1k′ ρk−k′ = x(σk′λ
−1γ−1γλσk−k′) = xσk
and
xρk′ρ
−1
kλ−k′ = x(γλσk′σkλ−k′λ
−1γ−1) = (xγλ + kλ)λ−1γ−1 = xγσkγ
−1.
It follows that the permutation
x↦ (x1, . . . , xi−1, xiτir , xi+1, . . . , xn)
belongs to Γh(C) = ⟨ρ,T (V )⟩. We conclude therefore that τ ∈ Γh(C), as desired.
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Remark 4.3. By a computer check on 4-bit S-Boxes, one can see that there
exist maps which are AC but do not satisfy condition (2) and, conversely, maps
satisfying condition (2) which are not AC.
In [3, Section 7], with C as in Theorem 2.4, it has been shown that Γh(C) cannot
be a wreath product (provided that the proper round is strongly proper). In the
next result we recall the proof and extend it to tb ciphers satisfying Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 4.4. Let C be a tb cipher with a strongly proper round h. If the
hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 (or Theorem 2.4, respectively) are satisfied, then the
primitive group Γh(C) is not a wreath product.
Proof. Of course the group Γh(C) = ⟨ρ,T (V )⟩ is primitive, by Theorem 3.1 (or
Theorem 2.4, respectively). Recall that ρ = γλ, where λ is a strongly proper mixing
layer. Suppose that G = Γh(C) = (S1 × . . . × Sc).O.P is the group given in (3) of
Corollary 3.4. Let S = S1× . . .×Sc. Then T ≤ S and G/S is a cyclic group generated
by ρS. Thus, arguing as in Section 7 of [3] (see also [10, Section 6]), we have
V =W1 ⊕ . . .⊕Wc
where each Wi = 0Ti ⊆ 0Si is a subspace of V such that Wiρ = Wi+1, for i =
1, . . . , c − 1, and Wcρ =W1. Furthermore, for any k ∈ {1, . . . , c}, we obtain
γˆu(v) = (u + v)γ + vγ ∈Wk+1λ
−1 (3)
for all u ∈Wk and v ∈ V .
Let pii be the projection of V onto Vi and take Ik to be the set of all i such
that pii(Wk) ≠ {0}. Clearly Ik ≠ ∅. Assume first Wk ∩ Vi = Vi for all k ∈ {1, . . . , c}
and i ∈ Ik. Thus Wk = ⊕i∈IkVi is a wall, for any k. In particular, Wkγ =Wk. Since
Wkρ = Wk+1, it follows that Wkλ = Wk+1 which is impossible, being λ strongly
proper. We may therefore assume Wk ∩ Vj ⊂ Vj, for some k ∈ {1, . . . , c} and j ∈ Ik.
Now, if Theorem 3.1 holds, then we get a contradiction arguing as in Theorem
3.1 with U = Wk,W = Wkγ = Wk+1λ
−1, and using (3) instead of Lemma 2.3.
Similarly, by [3, Section 7, part (II)], we have a contradiction when Theorem 2.4
is satisfied.
Notice that in Proposition 4.4 it is essential that the proper round is strongly
proper.
Example 4.5. Let V = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ V3 ⊕ V4, where each Vi = (F2)
4. Consider a
tb cipher C over V with the inversion map in F24 as S-Box for any round h, i.e.
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γi ∶ x ↦ x
2
4−2. Suppose that there is a unique mixing layer given by the following
matrix
λ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
0 I 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 0 0 I
I 0 0 0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
where 0 and I are respectively the zero and identity matrices acting on (F2)
4.
It is known that γi is weakly 2-uniform and strongly 1-anti-invariant, namely γi
satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 2.4. It is also easy to verify that λ is proper.
On the other hand, λ sends Vi to Vi+1, for i = 1,2,3, and V4 to V1. Thus λ is not
strongly proper. Furthermore, a computer check shows that Γh(C) = Γ∞(C) is a
wreath product.
We can now sum up our conclusions about the simplicity of Γ∞(C), as follows.
Theorem 4.6 (see also [3]). Let C be a tb cipher over V = (F2)
mn, with a strongly
proper round h such that the corresponding bricks are AC and satisfy the hypotheses
of Theorem 3.1 (or Theorem 2.4, respectively). Then Γ∞(C) = Alt(V ).
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 (or Theorem 2.4, respectively), the group Γh(C) is primi-
tive. Thus the claim follows applying first Corollary 3.4, and then Propositions 4.1
and 4.4.
Theorem 4.7. Let C be a tb cipher over V = (F2)
mn, with m ≥ 3, n ≥ 2 and a
strongly proper round h such that the corresponding bricks satisfy the hypotheses
of Theorem 3.1 (or Theorem 2.4, respectively). Suppose further that one of these
bricks satisfies condition (2) of Proposition 4.2. Then Γ∞(C) = Alt(V ).
Proof. As in Theorem 4.6, applying Proposition 4.2 instead of Proposition 4.1.
Corollary 4.8. Let C be a tb cipher over V = (F2)
mn with a strongly proper
round h such that the corresponding bricks satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1
(or Theorem 2.4, respectively). Suppose m = 3,4 or 5, and n ≥ 2. Then Γ∞(C) =
Alt(V ).
Proof. Let γi be any brick in the round h. Put Vi = (F2)
m and
G = ⟨σk, γiσkγ
−1
i ∣ k ∈ Vi⟩.
According to Theorem 4.7, it is enough to prove that Alt(Vi) ⊆ G. Actually, by
Corollary 3.4 and Proposition 3.5, it suffices to show that G is primitive. In fact, G
is a subgroup of Sym(Vi) generated by two elementary abelian regular subgroups,
namely T (Vi) and γiT (Vi)γ
−1
i .
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Suppose to the contrary that G is imprimitive. Let U be a nontrivial proper
subspace of Vi such that {U + v ∣ v ∈ Vi} is a block system of G on Vi. Then
(U + v)γiσkγ
−1
i = U + w, with v,w ∈ Vi. It follows that vγiσkγ
−1
i ∈ U + w and so
(U + v)γiσkγ
−1
i = U + vγiσkγ
−1
i = U + (vγi + k)γ
−1
i . Hence,
(U + v)γiσkγ
−1
i + (vγi + k)γ
−1
i = U.
Now, if v = 0 and k ∈ Uγi, then Uγiσkγ
−1
i = U because 0γi = 0. Hence Uγi+k = Uγi,
which implies that Uγi is a subspace of Vi. On the other hand, if k = vγi, we
have ((U + v)γi + vγi)γ
−1
i = U . Thus Im(γˆiu) ∪ {0} ⊆ Uγi, for any u ∈ U/{0}.
However 0 ∉ Im(γˆju) and γi is 2
r-uniform, so that ∣Uγi∣ ≥ 2
m−r
+ 1. In particular
dim(Uγi) ≥m−r+1, in contradiction to the assumption that γi is strongly (r−1)-
anti-invariant.
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of Corollary 4.8, Remark 2.5
and Remark 3.2.
Corollary 4.9. The round functions of PRESENT, RECTANGLE and PRINT-
cipher generate the alternating group.
5 Final remarks
Vectorial Boolean functions used as S-boxes in block ciphers must have low unifor-
mity to prevent linear cryptanalysis (see [19]), differential cryptanalysis (see [5, 21])
and high non-linearity. Differentially 2-uniform functions, also called Almost Per-
fect Non-linear (APN) functions, are optimal. The most common dimensions used
for S-boxes are even, often powers of 2. Unfortunately, no 4-bit APN permutation
exists and no APN permutation on (F2)
m with m even was known until in [20] it
has been constructed a 6-bit APN permutation (still now this is the only example
of APN permutation in even dimension). For this reason, the permutations used
as S-boxes in block ciphers are 4-uniform.
The following computational result has been obtained looking at all the affine
equivalence classes of 4-bit S-Boxes.
Fact 5.1. Let γ ∶ (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 be a 4-bit S-Box. If γ is 4-uniform, then it is
strongly 1-anti-invariant.
It would be interesting to give a direct proof of Fact 5.1. Indeed, by Theorem 3.1
and Corollary 4.8, this implies that the group generated by the round functions of a
tb cipher with a strongly proper round and bricks of dimension 4 is the alternating
group, provided that the bricks of the strongly proper round are 4-uniform.
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Next we relate the strongly 1-anti-invariance with the non-linearity, that is
another algebraic property of vectorial Boolean functions. More precisely, we will
show that, for a permutation, the strongly 1-anti-invariance is equivalent to the
fact that the permutation has non-linearity greater than 0.
For any m ≥ 1, let f and g be m-variable Boolean functions. The Hamming
distance between f and g is
d(f, g) = ∣{x ∈ (F2)
m ∣ f(x) ≠ g(x)}∣.
Recall also that f can be represented as a multivariate polynomial over F2. This
polynomial is called the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of f (see for instance
[12]) and its degree is the (algebraic) degree of f deg(f). The affine functions are
Boolean functions of degree at most 1, and they form a set which we denote by
Am. The non-linearity of f is then given by
N (f) =min{d(f,α) ∣ α ∈ Am}.
For a vectorial Boolean function f ∶ (F2)
m → (F2)
m, we denote by vf the com-
ponent ∑mi=1 vifi of f , where f1, . . . , fm are the coordinate functions of f , for all
v ∈ (F2)
m/{0}. Thus, we have
N (f) =min{N (vf) ∣ v ∈ (F2)
m/{0}}.
The following result is Proposition 5 of [2].
Proposition 5.2. Let f ∶ (F2)
m → (F2)
m be a vectorial Boolean function and
a ∈ (F2)
m/{0}. Let Va be the vector space {v ∈ (F2)
m ∣ deg(vfˆa) = 0}. Then af +V
⊥
a
is the smallest affine subspace of (F2)
m containing Im(fˆa).
We are now ready to prove the above announced result.
Proposition 5.3. Let m > 1 and let γ be a permutation of (F2)
m such that 0γ = 0.
Then N (γ) ≠ 0 if and only if γ is strongly 1-anti-invariant.
Proof. Let N (γ) ≠ 0 and suppose that γ is not strongly 1-anti-invariant. Then
there exist U, W < (F2)
m such that dim(U) = dim(W ) = m − 1 and Uγ = W .
As the non-linearity of a vectorial Boolean function is affine invariant (see for
instance [12]), without loss of generality, we may assume U = W = ⟨e1, . . . , em−1⟩,
where ei denotes the vector with 1 in the i-th position and 0 elsewhere. Thus
(F2)
m = U ⊍ (U + em), in other words U and (U + em) give a partition of (F2)
m.
Let u ∈ U with u ≠ 0. Since Uγ = U , we have (U +em)γ = U +em which implies that
(u+ v)γ + vγ ∈ U , for all v ∈ (F2)
m. Hence Im(γˆu) ⊂ U and, by Proposition 5.2, we
have V ⊥u + uγ ⊆ U . But uγ ∈ U , so that V
⊥
u ⊆ U and U
⊥ = ⟨em⟩ ⊆ Vu. It follows that
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⟨em⟩ ⊆ Vei for all ei with 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, i.e., the derivate (γ̂m)ei is constant. This
implies that in the ANF representation of γm the variable xi could appear only in
the part of degree 1, that is γm has at most degree 1, in contrast to the fact that
N (γ) ≠ 0.
Conversely, let γ be strongly 1-anti-invariant and suppose N (γ) = 0. As before,
let U = ⟨e1, . . . , em−1⟩ and (F2)
m = U ⊍ (U + em). Without loss of generality, we
may assume γm = xm. Since γ is a permutation, it is easy to verify that Uγ = U ,
which is a contradiction.
By the previous proposition an S-Box γ is strongly 1-anti-invariant if γ does
not have any affine component.
In general, the minimum request to prevent linear and differential attacks on
a block cipher is the 4-differential uniformity and the nonzero non-linearity of S-
Boxes. The lightweight translation based ciphers are often designed using m-bit
S-Boxes withm < 5, in order to have a low implementation complexity in hardware.
So, for this type of ciphers, by Corollary 4.8 and Proposition 5.3, the choice of a
strongly proper mixing layer allows to avoid some attacks based on the order or
the imprimitivity of the group generated by the round functions.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ralph Wernsdorf for his useful comments after
reading an earlier version of the manuscript.
References
[1] R. J. Anderson, E. Biham, L.R. Knudsen, SERPENT: A new block cipher
proposal, Fast Software Encryption, 222–238, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci.
1372, Springer, Berlin, 1998.
[2] R. Aragona, M. Calderini, D. Maccauro, M. Sala, On weak differential unifor-
mity of vectorial Boolean functions as a cryptographic criterion, Appl. Algebra
Engrg. Comm. Comput., 27 (2016), no. 5, 359–372.
[3] R. Aragona, A. Caranti, F. Dalla Volta, M. Sala, On the group generated by
the round functions of translation based ciphers over arbitrary fields, Finite
Fields Appl. 25 (2014), 293–305.
[4] R. Aragona, A. Caranti, M. Sala, The group generated by the round functions
of a GOST-like cipher, Ann. Mat. Pura Appl., 196 (2016), no. 1, 1–17.
16
[5] E. Biham, A. Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems,
J. Cryptology 4 (1991), no. 1, 3–72.
[6] A. Bogdanov et al., PRESENT: An ultra-lightweight block cipher, CHES ’07,
450–466, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 4727, Springer, Berlin, 2007.
[7] W. Bosma, J. Cannon, C. Playoust, The Magma algebra system. I. The user
language, J. Symbolic Comput. 24 (1997), no. 3–4, 235–265.
[8] M. Calderini, Elementary abelian regular subgroups as hidden sums for cryp-
tographic trapdoors, preprint, arXiv:1702.00581 [math.GR] (2017).
[9] A. Caranti, F. Dalla Volta, M. Sala, Abelian regular subgroups of the affine
group and radical rings, Publ. Math. Debrecen 69 (2006), no. 3, 297–308.
[10] A. Caranti, F. Dalla Volta, M. Sala, An application of the O’Nan-Scott theo-
rem to the group generated by the round functions of an AES-like cipher, Des.
Codes Cryptogr. 52 (2009), no. 3, 293–301.
[11] A. Caranti, F. Dalla Volta, M. Sala, On some block ciphers and imprimitive
groups, Appl. Algebra Engrg. Comm. Comput. 20 (2009), no. 5-6, 339–350.
[12] C. Carlet, P. Guillot, A new representation of Boolean functions, AAECC ’13,
94–103, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 1719, Springer, Berlin, 1999.
[13] D. Coppersmith, E. Grossman, Generators for certain alternating groups with
applications to cryptography, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 29 (1975), no. 4, 624–627.
[14] J. Daemen, V. Rijmen, The design of Rijndael: AES – the advanced encryption
standard, Information Security and Cryptography, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
2002.
[15] J.D. Dixon, B. Mortimer, Permutation groups, Graduate Texts in Mathemat-
ics 163, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1996.
[16] B. S. Kaliski, Jr., R. L. Rivest, A.T. Sherman, Is the data encryption standard
a group? (Results of cycling experiments on DES), J. Cryptology 1 (1988),
no. 1, 3–36.
[17] L. Knudsen et al., PRINTcipher: a block cipher for IC-printing, CHES ’10,
6–32, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 6225, Springer, Berlin, 2010.
[18] C.H. Li, The finite primitive permutations group containing an abelian regular
subgroup, Proc. London Math. Soc. 87 (2003), no. 3, 725–747.
17
[19] M. Matsui, Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher, Advances in cryp-
tology – EUROCRYPT ’93, 386–397, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 765,
Springer, Berlin, 1994.
[20] M.T. McQuistan, A. J. Wolfe, K.A. Browning, J. F. Dillon. An APN permuta-
tion in dimension six, Finite fields: theory and applications, 33–42, Contemp.
Math. 518, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, RI, 2010.
[21] K. Nyberg, Differentially uniform mappings for cryptography, Advances in
cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’93, 55–64, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 765,
Springer, Berlin, 1994.
[22] K.G. Paterson, Imprimitive permutation groups and trapdoors in interated
block ciphers, Fast Software Encryption, 201–214, Lecture Notes in Comput.
Sci. 1636, Springer, Berlin, 1999.
[23] R. Sparr, R. Wernsdorf, Group theoretic properties of Rijndael-like ciphers,
Discrete Appl. Math. 156 (2008), no. 16, 3139–3149.
[24] R. Sparr, R. Wernsdorf, The round functions of KASUMI generate the alter-
nating group, J. Math. Cryptol. 9 (2015), no. 1, 23–32.
[25] R. Wernsdorf, The one-round functions of the DES generate the alternating
group, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’92, 99–112, Lecture Notes
in Comput. Sci. 658, Springer, Berlin, 1993.
[26] R. Wernsdorf, The round functions of SERPENT
generate the alternating group, 2000; available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/round2/comments/20000512-rwernsdorf.pdf.
[27] R. Wernsdorf, The round functions of RIJNDAEL generate the alternating
group, Fast Software Encryption 143-148, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci.
2365, Springer, Berlin, 2002.
[28] W. Zhang et al., RECTANGLE: a bit-slice lightweight block cipher suitable
for multiple platforms, Sci. China Inf. Sci. 58 (2015), no. 12, 1–15.
18
